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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
January 6, 1984 Conference
List 5, Sheet 3
No. 83-751 CFX
SEC, et al.

Cert to CA9
(Skopil, Pregerson, Ferguson)

(agency employees)

v.
~ ~ JERRY

T. O'BRIEN, INC., et al.
(SEC investigation targets)

1.

(

SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

CA9 ruled that the SEC must notify targets

of investigations when subpoenas are issued to third parties.
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2.

In September 1980, the

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

SEC issued a Formal Order of Investigation (FOI) directed at certain trading in mining company stock.

An FOI empowers the staff vt

to issue agency subpoenas, which can be

en~rced

only by ~urt.

----·

Resps are a stock brokerage firm, one of its employees, and its
accountant, who is also a customer of the brokerage firm.

named in the FOI and others were not.

~

According to resps, the

SEC staff vastly exceeded the scope of

the FOI,

investigating

transactions in many other companies' stock and transactions that
took place after the date of the FOI.
SEC

subpoenaed

resps.

They

In May and July 1981, the

generally

declined

to

cooperate.

\/Resps brought this action seeking damages ·under the Privacy Act 7
(

and

an

injunction against

further

investigation on

the ground

that it was being conducted beyond the scope of the FOI.

(The

brokerage firm at first also sought to enjoin the accounting firm
from

complying

with

the

subpoenas;

later

the

accounting

firm

filed a cross-complaint against the SEC seeking the same relief
as the brokerage firm sought.)
In January 1982, the DC

(ED wash, McNichols, J.)

dismissed

resps' equitable claims, holding that they had an adequate remedy

--at law since they
could contest the scope of the investigation if
the SEC ever sought to enforce the subpoenas.

The SEC did not

immediately seek to enforce the subpoenas, but continued to subpoena third parties.

Resps went back into DC and sought an order

requiring notice of subpoenas to third parties so they could at-

..
tempt

to block compliance.

In March

198 2,

the DC refused

to

grant relief.
It found that this Court's cases had created

~~-rot

protections for targets of

investigations. ~

when subpoenas are directed at them, they can resist enforcement
by requiring the agency to show that (1) it has a legitimate purpose for the investigation,
purpose,
and

(3) the agency does not possess the information sought,

(4)

the agency has adhered to administrative steps required

by law.

United States v.

Powell,

379

u.s. 48, 57-58 (1964).

~'

when third parties are summoned by subpoena, those af-

fected

by a disclosure may seek to prevent compliance through

permissive

(

( 2) the inquiry is relevant to that

intervention

in

an

through an injunctive action.
440' 445

(1963).

enforcement

action,

or

See Reisman v. Caplan,

perhaps
375 U.S.

-

However, CA9 reasoned, unless targets know of

subpoenas to third parties, the targets' "right to be investigated consistently with the Powell standards" as a practical matter
will go unprotected.
to protect that right.

Third parties lack standing and motivation
Notice to targets of third-party subpoe-

nas need not unduly burden the agency or courts, because compliance with the Powell standards can be determined on the basis of
affidavits.

The court left open the possibility that in "special

circumstances involving a serious threat to the integrity of the
inve7 .gation" notice might not be required.
Five
sented

(

judges

(Kennedy, Sneed, Ander son, Poole, N_orris)

from denial of rehearing en bane.
I

'

dis-

The~ thought

" •

that the panel decision was "novel, of vast importance, and •••

'{

erroneous," and that refusal to rehear it "imposes an unnecessary
burden on the Supreme Court."

It said the decision threatened to

compromise government investigations by most agencies because it
would provide a new instrument for obstruction and delay, would
chill employees and others from cooperating with investigators,
and would force

the government to articulate premature conclu-

sions about potential targets.
3.

the notice require-

CONTENTIONS:

atutOry basis and is not suggest-

ment has no constitutional

ed by Powell, which merely outlined the proof
agency in order to enforce its subpoenas.

required of the

In fact, Congress has

considered the issue and provided for notice of third-party subpoenas only in narrowly defined circumstances involving customers

(

of financial institutions.

u.s.c. §3401, 15 u.s.c. §78u{h).

1978, 12
because

See Right to Financial Privacy Act of

the

alleged

improprieties

may

Notice is not needed

be

challenged when

the

agency institutes a subpoena enforcement or other action against
the targets themselves.
517,

531

(1966)

See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S.

{target of

tax

investigation has no absolute

right to intervene in subpoena-enforcement proceeding, any protectable interest can be asserted at trial).

The decision below

conflicts

whether

notice

of

United

States

v.

with

third-party

every

subpoenas

other

CA to

is

required,

consider
citing

Schutterle, 586 F.2d 1201, 1204 {CA8 1978), Scarafiotti v. Shea,
456 F.2d 1052, 1053

(CAlO 1972), and In re Cole, 342 F.2d 5, 8

(CA2), cert. denied, 381

(

u.s. 950 {1965).

The one court to con-

{

sider the decision below has rejected it.

See PepsiCo, Inc. v.

SEC, 563 F. Supp. 828, 831-832 (SONY 1983).
The SG also argues that CA9's decision has t seriously £ isrupted the SEC's investigations, and is almost certain to impair the
~

operation of more than 100 federal programs that depend on similar subpoenas.

The SEC is holding in abeyance many of its cur-

rent investigations in CA9.

The Comm'n conducts up to 1,200 for-

mal

and CA9 's dec is ion,

investigations a year,

nationwide,

would

if

implemented

require at least 15,000 notices a year.

If

notice were required to persons not named in FOis, more would be
required.

Requiring notice would increase opportunities for de-

struction of documents, intimidation of witnesses, and tailoring
of testimony.

(

It is the threat of such

secrecy of grand jury proceedings.

t~~l-

obstruction ~ underlies

the

Moreover, delay will result

because targets will encourage witnesses not to comply, forcing
many more enforcement proceedings than otherwise would be necessary.

The ruling below also will create uncertainty since the

court did not define the term "target," a term not used by the
SEC itself.
Resps have filed

two briefs in response.

They essentially

repeat the arguments of the panel opinion below, noting in addition that the government is wrong that targets have an adequate
remedy at trial.

This Court has never held the evidence wrong-

fully obtained can be suppressed in a civil proceeding, which is
the

route

the

SEC

frequently

selects.

there is no conflict with other CAs.

Resps also argue that

Schutterle merely held that

there was no constitutional right to notice of third-party sub-

.(

poenas.

In Scarafiotti, the target sought notice of any inter-

view of a witness, not just subpoenas: moreover, the action was
one for mandamus, and the court merely found that the duty sought
to be imposed was not so "plainly defined" as to be free from
doubt.

In Cole, the taxpayer already knew of the summons on the

bank, so the court naturally held that no notice was required.
Finally, in PepsiCo the plaintiff was not challenging the SEC's
investigation, but merely sought notice to ensure compliance with
Powell.
Resps also argue that the litany of horribles recited by the
government amount

to no more

than agency

inconvenience,

which

should not block the attainment of rights conferred by this Court
and Congress.

(

The same fears were expressed by the SEC before

Congress prior to passage of the Right to Financial Privacy Act.
SEC investigations are not like grand jury investigations, which
operate independently of, and as a check on, the prosecutor, and
involve only criminal violations.

SEC investigations are more

like a one-sided civil discovery overseen by the courts.
4.

DISCUSSION:

Resps

accurately

characterize

Schutterle and Scaraf iotti, but there does appear to be a conflict with CA2's opinion in Cole.

The court there held that tax-

payers were not entitled to notice of a summons on their bank
since

the

taxpayers

did

not

own

the

therefore had no standing to object.

material

requested,

and

CA2 did not, however, ex-

pressly consider the right found by CA9 to be investigated only
pursuant
(

to

the Powell standards.

The DC opinion

in PepsiCo,

written by Judge Sofaer, is directly in conflict with the opinion

c ..

oc

i

4

below (a 1 though
could

be appropriate

opinions of
tions

the -eou r t

are

in

U19r; )_ did

suggest

individual case :).

that

such

relief

Judge Sofaer cited

this Court that suggest that government investiganot

to

be

burdened

Hannah v. Larche, 363

with

trial-type procedures,

see

u.s. 420, 445-448 (1960) (approving Civil

Rights Comm'n investigatory rules), and that issuance of subpoenas to third parties does not implicate the rights of the target
of the investigation, United States v. Miller, 425
(1976)

u.s. 435, 444

(denying motion to suppress records obtained from third

party) •
Regardless of whether all the dire consequences listed by the
government will in fact flow from CA9's decision--and resps do
not effectively rebut the SG's claims--it seems obvious that the

(

decision
~

least

imposes

in CA9,

a

substantial

~----

burden on

the

government.

At

----------------~-----------

the SEC and perhaps other agencies will have to

create a new procedure to identify "targets," and mail hundreds
t...

or

----------------

thousands of notices a year.

Especially since the new re-

""""'
quirement
is intended to effectuate rights assertedly created by
the opinions of this Court, it would seem that it should be imposed, if at all, by this Court and not merely by one Circuit.
Therefore, I do not see any alternative to taking this case.

Be-

cause of the burden on the government, · it ·.·. probably is not the
kind of matter

that can be left for development

in the lower

courts.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend a GRANT.

There are two responses.

(
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-751
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. JERRY T. O'BRIEN, INC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1984]
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
?t II
~
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or
/
"Commission") has statutory authority to conduct _QOnpublic ~ """' "
investigations into possible violations of the securities laws
~p-- ..... 7
ana, in The course thereof, to iSsue subpoenas to obtain rele~ !- 0--~nt information. The ques Ion be ore us Is w ether the ~
CommiSSion must notify the "targgt" of such an investigation
-:
when it issues a subpoena to a Uilrd party.
~~ {
~

(,P71

bul- . --.

::;JJ,. ..

- - - - - - - --

This case represents o e shard fa prolonged investigation
by the SEC into the affairs
espondent Harry F. Magnuson and persons and firms with whom he has dealt. The investigation began in 1980, when the Commission's staff reported to the Commission that information in their possession
tended to show that Magnuson and others had been trading
in the stock of specified mining companies in a manner violative of the registration, reporting, and antifraud provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. In response, the Commission issued a Formal
Order of Investigation 1 authorizing employees of its Seattle
A Formal Order of Investigation is issued by the Commission only after
its staff has conducted a preliminary inquiry, in the course of which
"no process is issued [nor] testimony compelled." 17 CFR § 202.5 (1983).
The purposes of such an order are to define the scope of the ensuing inves1

I

.

I

!:i;

'

.
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Regional Office to initiate a "private investigation" into the
transactions in question and, if necessary, to subpoena testimony and documents "deemed relevant or material to the inquiry." Complaint, Exhibit A at 2-3.
Acting on that authority, members of the Commission staff
subpoenaed financial records in the possession of res ondent
Jerry .
r1en, Inc. (0' rien), a roker- ea er firm, and
respondent Pennaluna & Co. (Pennaluna). O'Brien vo~
tari y complied, but Pennaluna refuse to disgorge t!w requested materials. Soon thereafter, in response to several
inq~rien's counsel, a member of the SEC staff informed O'Brien that _li was a "subject" of the investigation.
O'Brien, Pennaluna, and their respective owners 2
promptly filed a suit in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Washington, seeking to enjoin the Commission's
investigation and to prevent Magnuson from complying with
subpoenas that had been issued to him. 3 Magnuson filed a
cross-claim, also seeking to block portions o_f.Jhe investigation. O'Brien then filed motions seeking authority to depose
the Commission's officers and to conduct expedited discovery
into the Commission's files. 4
tigation and to establish limits within which the staff may resort to compulsory process. See SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F. 2d 1018, 1023
(CADC 1978), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1071 (1979).
2
The relationships between Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., Pennaluna & Co.,
and their individual owners are not fully eludicated by the papers before
us. Because, for the purposes of this litigation, the interests of all of these
respondents are identical, hereinafter they will be referred to collectively
as O'Brien, except when.divergence in their treatment by the courts below
requires that they be differentiated.
8
The gravamen of O'Brien's suit was that the SEC's Formal Order of
Investigation was defective, that the the investigation did not have a valid
purpose, that the Commission should have afforded the subjects of the investigation a chance to comment upon it, that the issues around which the
case revolved had been litigated and settled in another proceeding in 1975,
and that the constitutional, statutory, and common-law privacy rights of
the subjects of the inquiry were being abridged. Complaint 3-16.
'During the pendency of the suit, the Commission, at the District

83-751-0PINION
SEC v. JERRY T. O'BRIEN, INC.

3

The District Court denied respondents' discovery motions
and soon thereafter disimsse t e1r c a1ms or injunctive relief. Jerry T. O'Brien v. SEC, No. C-81-546 (ED Wash.,
Jan 20, 1982). The principal ground for the court's decision
was that respondents would have a full opportunity to assert
their objections to the basis and scope of the SEC's investigation if and when the Commission instituted a subpoena enforcement action. The court did, however, rule that the
Commission's outstanding subpoenas 5 met the requirements
outlined in United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48 (1964), for
determining whether an administrative summons is judicially
enforceable. Specifically, the District Court held that the
Commission had a legitimate purpose in issuing the subpoenas, that the requested information was relevant and was not
already in the Commission's possession, and that the issuance of the subpoenas comported with pertinent procedural
requirements.
Following the District Court's decision, the SEC issued
several sub oenas to third parties. In response, agnuson
and O'Brien renewed err request to the District Court for
injunctive relief, accompanying the request with a motion,
pursuant to Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for a stay pending appeal. For the first time, respondents expressly sought notice of the subpoenas issued by the
Co~
parties.
easomng
s on ents
la~ enge voluntary compliance with subpoenas by third parties, and that, in any subsequent proceeding brought by the SEC, respondents could move to suppress
evidence the Commission had obtained from third parties
through abusive subpoenas, the District Court denied the reCourt's request, refrained from seeking enforcement of its outstanding
subpoenas.
• Because no subpoenas were then outstanding against Jerry T.
O'Brien, Inc. or O'Brien in his personal capacity, the District Court
declined to determine whether the Commission had complied with the
Powell standards in demanding records from those respondents.

..

•

0

~751-0PINION
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4

quested relief. Jerry T. O'Brien v. SEC, Civ. No. C-81-546
• •
(ED Wash., March 25, 1982). 6
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed t e IS ric Court s derua o InJunctive re Ie with
re~d to the su oenas drrecte at res ondents
emse ves,
agreeing with the lower court that respondents ad an a equate remedy at law for challenging those subpoenas. 7 704
F. 2d 1065, 1066-1067 (CA9 1983). However, the Court of
A~ls reve ed the District Court's denial of respondents'
request £ notice o) subpoenas issued to third parties. In
the Co
. ppeals' view, "targets" of SEC investigations
"have a right to be investigated consistently with the Powell
standards." Id., at 1068. To enable targets to enforce this
· right, the court held that they must be notified of subpoenas
issued to others. I d., at 1069.
The Court of Appeals .denied the Commission's request for
rehearing and rejected its suggestion for rehearing en bane.
719 F. 2d 300 (CA9 1983). Judge Kennedy, joined by four
other judges, dissented from the rejection, arguing that the
panel decision was unprecedented and threatened the ability
of the SEC and other agencies to conduct nonpublic investigations into possible violations of federal law. Ibid.
The District Court granted respondents a brief stay to enable them to
petition the Court of Appeals for a longer stay pending disposition of the
appeal, but the Court of Appeals refused to enjoin the Commission from
proceeding with its investigation. The SEC then filed various subpoena
enforcement actions. The Commission has prevailed in at least one of
those suits, SEC v. Magnuson, No. 82-1178-Z (D Mass., Aug. 11, 1982)
(enforcing subpoenas to Magnuson family members); another is still pending, see SEC v. Magnuson, et al., No. C-82-282-RJM (ED Wash., under
submission). Cf. Magnuson v. SEC , No. 82-2042 (D Idaho, July 27, 1982)
(rejecting motion by Magnuson and his wife to quash subpoenas directed to
a financial institution).
7
Because respondents have not cross-petitioned, the validity of the
Court of Appeals' ruling on the merits of respondents' claims for injunctive
relief is not before us.
5
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5

We granted certiorari because of the importance
e
issue presented: --U.S.-- (1984). We now everse
II

Congress has vested the SEC with broad authority to conduct investigations into possible violations of the federal securities laws and to demand production of evidence relevant
to such investigations. E. g., 15 U. S. C. §§ 77s(b), 78u(a}(b). 8 Subpoenas issued by the Commission are not selfenforcing, and the recipients thereof are not subject to penalty for refusal to obey. But the Commission is authorized
to bring suit in federal court to compel compliance with its
process. E. g., 15 U. S. C. §§ 77v(b), 78u(c). 9
No provision in the complex of statutes governing the
SEC'S mves~1ga~ e r ss y o ges e ommission
to notify the "tar et" of an investigation when it issues a subpoena to a third party. If such an obligation is to be imposed
on the Commission, therefore, it must be derived from one of
three sources: a constitutional provision; an understanding on
the part of Congress, inferrable from the structure of the securities laws, regarding how the SEC should conduct its inquiries; or the general standards governing judicial enforcement of administrative subpoenas enunciated in United
States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48 (1964), and its progeny.
Examination of these three potential bases for the Court of
8

The provisions cited in the text are the pertinent provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, respectively.
In conducting the investigation that gives rise to this case, the Commission
relied solely on those acts. Many other statutes administered by the SEC
contain similar provisions. See 15 U. S. C. § 79r (Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935); 15 U. S. C. § 77uuu(a) (Trust Indenture Act of
1939); 15 U. S. C. §§ 80a-40(a), (b) (Investment Company Act of 1940); 15
U. S. C. §§ 80b-9(a), (b) (Investment Advisors Act of 1940).
• The analogous enforcement provisions for the other statutes administered by the Commission are: 15 U. S. C. § 79r(d) (Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935); 15 U. S. C. § 77uuu(a) (Trust Indenture Act of
1939); 15 U. S. C. §§ 80a-40(c) (Investment Company Act of 1940); 15
U. S. C. §§ 80b-9(c) (Investment Advisors Act of 1940).

?-t...ZJ

'

.
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Appeals' ruling leaves us unpersuaded that the notice requirement fashioned by that court is warranted.
A
Our prior cases foreclose an constitutional argument respondents might make m defense of t e JU gmen below.
The opinion of the Court in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420
(1960), leaves no doubt that neither the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment nor the Coruroiitatlon Clause' of the
Sixth Amendment is offended when a federal administrative
ag_ency, without not' ng a person un er mvestiga 10n, uses
itsSUbpoena power to gather evidence adverse to him. The
Due Process --erause 1s not 1mplicatea under such circumstances because an administrative investigation adjudicates
no legal rights, id., at 440-443, and the Confrontation Clause
does not come into play until the initiation of criminal proceedings, id., at 440, n. 16. These principles plainly cover an
inquiry by the SEC into possible violations of the securities
laws.
It is also settled that a person inculpated by materials
sought by a subpoena issued to a third party cannot seek
shelter in the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The rationale of this doctrine is that the Constitution
proscribes only compelled self-incrimination, and, whatever
may be the position of the person to whom a subpoena is directed, 10 the subpoena surely does not "compel" anyone else
to be a witness against himself. Fisher v. United States, 425
U. S. 391, 397 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322,
328-329 (1973). If the "target" of an investigation by the
SEC has no Fifth Amendnle'iitright to challenge enforcement
of a subpoena directed at a third party, he clearly can assert
no derivative right to notice when the Commission issues
such a subpoena.
Finally, respondents cannot invoke the Fourth Amendment in support of the Court of Appeals' decision. It is es1"Cf. United States v. Doe,- U . S . - , - (1984) (slip op. 5-8).

1
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tablished that, when a person communicates information to a
third party even on the understanding that the communication is confidential, he cannot object if the third party conveys that information or records thereof to law enforcement
authorities. United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 443
(1976). Relying on that principle, the Court has held that a
customer of a bank cannot challenge on Fourth Amendment
grounds the admission into evidence in a criminal prosecution
of financial records obtained by the Government from his
bank pursuant to allegedly defective subpoenas, despite the
fact that he was given no notice of the subpoenas. I d., at
443, n. 5. 11 See also Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S.
517, 522 (1971) (Internal Revenue summons directed to third
party does not trench upon any interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment). 12 These rulings disable respondents
from arguing that notice of subpoenas issued to third parties
is necessary to allow a target to prevent an unconstitutional
search or seizure of his papers.
B
The language and structure of the statutes administered by
the CommissiOn or res on en s no greater aid. The provisions vesting the SE with the power o Issue and seek enforcement of subpoenas are expansive. For example, section 19(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 empowers the SEC to
conduct investigations "which, in the opinion of the Commission, are necessary and proper for the enforcement" of the
act and to "require the production of any books, papers, or
other documents which the Commission deems relevant or
It should be noted that any Fourth Amendment claims that might be
asserted by respondents are substantially weaker than those of the bank
customer in Miller because .respondents, unlike the customer, cannot argue
that the subpoena recipients were required by law to keep the records in
question. Cf. 425 U. S., at 455-456 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
12
Cf. Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc.,- U . S . - , - (1984) (slip op.
6-7) (discussing the Fourth Amendment rights of the recipient of an
adminstrative subpoena).
11

'

.
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material to the inquiry." 15 U. S. C. § 77s(b). Similarly,
§§ 21(a) and 21(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorize the Commission to "make such investigations as it
deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is about to violate any provisions of this
title [or] the rules or regulations thereunder" and to demand
to see any papers "the Commission deems relevant or material to the inquiry." 15 U. S. C. § 78u(a), (b). 13
More generally, both statutes vest the SEC with "power to
make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement their provisions .... " 15 U. S. C.
§§ 77s(a), 78w(a)(1). Relying on this authority, the SEC has
promulgated a variety of rules governing its ·investigations,
one of which provides that, "[u]nless otherwise ordered by
the Commission, all formal investigative proceedings shall be
non-public." 17 CFR § 203. 5. In other words, the Commission has formally adopted the policy of not routinely informing anyone, including targets, of the existence and progress
of its investigations. 14 To our knowledge, Congress has
never questioned this exercise by the Commission o 1ts statutory power.
, m a o er con ext, we ave 11e10that
rule:making authority comparable to that enjoyed by the
SEC is broad enough to empower an agency to "establish
standards for determining whether to conduct an investigation publicly or in private." FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U. S.
279, 292 (1965).
It appears, in short, that Congress intended to vest the
SEC with considerable discretion in determining when and
how to investigate possible violations of the statutes adminis13
The other statutes administered by the SEC contain similarly broad
delegations of investigatory power. See the provisions cited in n. 8,

supra.
14
In practice, virtually all investigations conducted by the Commission
are nonpublic. See 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1955 (2d ed. 1961);
SEC, Report of the Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and
Practices 18 (1972).
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tered by the Commission. We discern no evidence that Congress wished or expected that the Commission would adopt
any particular procedures for notifying "targets" of investigations when it sought information from third parties.
The inference that the relief sought by respondents is not
necessary to give effect to Congressional intent is reinforced
by the fact that, in one special context, Congress has imposed
on the Commission an obligation to notify persons directly affected by its subpoenas. In 1978, in response to this Court's
decision in United States v. Miller, supra, 15 Congress enacted
the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U. S. C. § 3401 et seq.
That statute accords customers of banks and similar financial
institutions certain r.ights to be notified of and to challenge in
court administrative subpoenas of financial records in the
possession of the banks. The most salient feature of the act
is the narrow scope of the entitlements it creates. Thus, it
carefully limits the kinds of customers to whom it applies,
§ 3401(4), (5), and the types of records they may seek to protect, § 3401(2). A customer's ability to challenge a subpoena
is cabined by strict procedural requirements. For example,
he must assert his claim within a short period of time,
§ 3410(a), and cannot appeal an adver.se determination until
the Government has completed its investigation, § 3410(d). )
Perhaps most importantly, the statute is drafted in a fashion
that minimizes the risk that customers' objections to subpoenas will delay or frustrate agency investigations. Thus, a ·
court presented with such a challenge is required to rule upon
it within seven days of the Government's response, § 3410(b),
and the pertinent statutes of limitations are tolled while the
claim is pending, § 3419. Since 1980, the SEC has been subject to the constraints of the Right to Financial Privacy Act.
15 U. S. C. § 78u(h)(1). When it made the statute applicable
See H. R. Rep. No. 95-1383, p. 34 (1978) (the purpose of the statute is
to fill the gap left by the ruling in Miller that a bank customer has "no
standing under the Constitution to contest Government access to financial
records").
15

83-751-0PINION
SEC v. JERRY T. O'BRIEN, INC.

10

to the SEC, however, Congress empowered the Commission
in prescribed circumstances to seek ex parte orders authorizing it to delay notifying bank customers when it subpoenas
information about them, thereby further curtailing the ability
of persons under investigation to impede the agency's inquiries. 15 U. S. C. § 78u(h)(2).
Considerable insight into the legislators' conception of the
scope of the SEC's investigatory power can be gleaned from
the foregoing developments. We know that Congress recently had occasion to consider the authority of the SEC and
other agencies to issue and enforce administrative subpoenas
without notifying the persons whose affairs may be exposed
thereby. In response, Congress enacted a set of carefully
tailored limitations on the agencies' power, designed "to
strike a balance between customers' right of privacy and the
need of law enforcement agencies to obtain financial records
pursuant to legitimate investigations." H. R. Rep. No.
9&-1383, p. 33 (1978). The manner in which Congress dealt
with this problem teaches us two things. First, it seems apparent that Congress assumed that the SEC was not and
would not be subject to a general obligation to notify "targets" of its investigations whenever it issued adminstrative
subpoenas. 16 • Second, the complexity and subtlety of the procedures embodied in the Right to Financial Privacy Act suggests that Congress would firid trouBling the crude and unqualified notification requirement orde'red by the Court of
Appeals. 17
"
_
'
-

f

16

In this regard, it is noteworthy that the pertinent Congressional committees expressed their desire that the judiciary not supplement the remedies created by the statute with any implied causes of action. See H. R.
Rep. No. 96-1321 (Pt. 1), p. 10 (1980); H. R. Rep. No. 95-1383, pp. 54, 56,
225, 230 (1978).
17
The significance of these two lessons is not that they illuminate Congress' intent when it enacted or when it subsequently amended the crucial
provisions vesting the Commission with investigatory authority, see
supra, a t - . Rather, they inform our determination whether adoption
of the remedy proposed by respondents would comport with or disrupt the

\
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c
The last of the three potential footings for the remedy
sought by respondents is some other entitlement that would
be effectuated thereby. Respondents seek to derive such an
entitlement from a combination of our prior decisions. Distilled, their argument is as follows: A subpoena issued by the
SEC must comport with the standards set forth in our decision in United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48, 57-58 (1964). 18
system of statutes governing the issuance and trading of securities, as that
system has been modified and refined by Congress in the years since 1933.
In this regard, our inquiry is analogous to the kind of analysis contemplated by the third of the four factors we consider when deciding whether
it would appropriate to create a private right of action as an adjunct to a
right created by statute: "[l]s it consistent with the underlying purposes of
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy ... ?" See, e. g., Cannon
v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703-708(1979); Cart v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 78 (1975).
18
The holding of Powell was that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
need not demonstrate probable cause in order to secure judicial enforcement of a summons issued pursuant to § 7602 of the Internal Revenue
Code. The Court then went on to sketch the requirements that the Commissioner would be obliged to satisfy:
"He must show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to that purpose, that
the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed. . . . [A] court may not permit its process to be abused. Such an
abuse would take place if the summons had been issued for an improper
purpose, such as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle
a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of
the particular investigation." 379 U. S., at 57--58 (footnote omitted); see
United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U. S. 298, 313-314 (1978).
Some lower courts have held or assumed that the SEC must satisfy these
standards in order to obtain enforcement of its subpoenas. E. g., SEC v.
ESM Government Securities, Inc., 645 F. 2d 310, 313-314 (CA5 1981).
But cf. In re EEOC, 709 F. 2d 392, 398, n. 2 (CA5 1983). Respondents
contend that the obligation of an agency to follow pertinent "administrative
steps" means in this context that any subpoena issued under the auspices of
the SEC must come within the purview of a Formal Order of Investigation,
see n. 1, supra. Because of the manner in which we dispose of this case,
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Not only the recipient of an SEC subpoena, but also any person who would be affected by compliance therewith, has a
substantive right, under Powell, to insist that those standards are met. A target of an SEC investigation may assert
the foregoing right in two ways. First, relying on Reisman
v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440, 445 (1964), and Donaldson v.
United States, 400 U. S., at 529,'9 the target may seek permissive intervention in an enforcement action brought by the
Commission against the subpoena recipient. Second, if the
recipient of the subpoena threatens voluntarily to turn over
the requested information, the target "might restrain compliance" by the recipient, thereby forcing the Commission to institute an enforcement suit. See Re~sman v. Caplin, 375
U. S., at 450. A target can avail himself of these options
only if he is aware of the existence of subpoenas directed at
others. To ensure that ignorance does not prevent a target
from asserting his rights, respondents conclude, the Copimission must notify him when it issues a subpoena to a third
party.
There are several tenuous links in respondents' argument.
Especially debatable are the proposition that a target has a
substantive right to be investigated in a manner consistent
with the Powell standards and the assertion that a target
may obtain a restraining order preventing voluntary compliance by a third party with an administrative subpoena. Certainly we have never before expressly so held. For the
we have no occasion to pass upon respondents' characterization or application of our decision in Powell.
'"In Reisman, the Court indicated in dictum that "both parties summoned [under§ 7602] and those affected by a disclosure may appear or intervene before the District Court and challenge the summons by asserting
their constitutional or other claims." 375 U. S., at 445; see id., at 449.
Our decision in Donaldson made clear that the right of a third party to
intervene in an enforcement action "is permissive only and is not mandatory," 400 U. S., at 529, and that determination whether intervention
should be granted in a particular case requires "[t]he usual process of balancing opposing equities," id., at 530.
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present, however, we may assume arguendo that a target enjoys each of the substantive and procedural rights identified
by respondents. Nevertheless, we conclude that it would be
inappropriate to elaborate upon those entitlements by mandating notification of targets whenever the Commission issues subpoenas.
Two considerations underlie our decision on this issue.
F. , a ministration o e notice reqmrement a voca ed by
r spondents wouldl'ie highly Burdensome Tor ooththe Commission and tlie courts. •r:ne most obvious difficulty would
involve identification of the persons and organizations that
should be considered "targets" of investigations. 20 The SEC
often undertakes investigations into suspicious securities
transactions without any knowledge of which of the parties
involved may have violated the law. 21 To notify all potential
wrongdoers in such a situation of the issuance of each subpoena would be virtually impossible. The Commission
would thus be obliged to determine the point at which enough
evidence had been assembled to focus suspicion on a manageable subset of the participants in the transaction, thereby
lending them the status of "targets" and entitling them to notice of the outstanding subpoenas directed at others. The
complexity of that task is apparent. Even in cases in which
the Commission could identify with reasonable ease the principal targets of its inquiry, another problem would arise. In
such circumstances, a person not considered a target by the
Commission could contend that he deserved that status and
therefore should be given notice of subpoenas issued to others. To assess such a claim, a district court would be obliged
Neither the pertinent statutes nor the Commission's regulations define
or even use the term "target," so either the Commission or the courts
would be obliged at the outset to develop a working definition of the term.
21
So, for example, the Commission is sometimes called upon to investigate unusually active trading in the stock of a company during the period
immediately preceding a tender offer for that stock. In such a case, the
Commission may have no idea which (if any) of the thousands of purchasers
was given improper access to inside information.
21)

'

.
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to conduct some kind of hearing to determine the scope and
thrust of the ongoing investigation. 22 Implementation of this
new remedy would drain the resources of the judiciary as
w~he Commission. 23
~~d, the imposition of a notice requirement on the SEC
would substantially increase the ability of persons who have
something to 1 e to impe e eg~tima e mves 1ga 1ons y the
Comm1ss1on.
target given notice of every subpoena issued to third parties would be able to discourage the recipients from complying, and then further delay disclosure of
damaging information by seeking intervention in all enforcement actions brought by the Commission. More seriously,
the understanding of the progress of an SEC inquiry that
would flow from knowledge of which persons had received
subpoenas would enable an unscrupulous target to destroy or
alter documents, intimidate witnesses, or transfer securities
or funds so that they could not be reached by the Government. 24 Especially in the context of securities regulation,
where speed in locating and halting violations of the law is so
important, we would be loathe to place such potent weapons
22

Cf. Jerry T. O'Brien v. SEC, 704 F. 2d 1065, 1069 (CA9 1983) ("The
target's right could be asserted . . . by other appropriate district court
proceedings").
28
It would also have the effect of laying bare the state of Commission's
knowledge and intentions midway through investigations. For the reasons sketched below, such exposure could significantly hamper the Commission's efforts to police violations of the securities laws.
usee PepsiCo. v. SEC, 563 F. Supp. 828,832 (SDNY 1983) (To impose a
notification requirement on the SEC "would necessarily permit all targets-and presumably all potential targets-effectively to monitor the
course and conduct of agency investigations. Experience and common
sense should establish that such a power would be greatly abused .... ");
cf. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U. S. 214, 239 (1978) (citing
the risk that employers or unions would attempt to "coerce or intimidate
employees and others who have given statements" as a reason for holding
exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act statements
given by witnesses to the NLRB).
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in the hands of persons with a desire to keep the Commission
at bay.
We aclmowledge that our ruling may have the effect in
practice of preventing some persons under investigation by
the SEC from asserting objections to subpoenas issued by
the Commission to third parties for improper reasons. However, to accept respondents' proposal ''would unwarrantedly
cast doubt upon and stultify the [Commission's] every investigatory move," Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S., at
531. Particularly in view of Congress' manifest disinclination to require the Commission to notify targets whenever it
seeks information from others, see supra, at - - , we refuse
so to curb the Commission's exercise of its statutory power. 25

III
Nothing in this opinion should be construed to imply that it
would be improper for the SEC to inform a target that it has
issued a subpoena to someone else. But, for the reasons indicated above, we decline to curtail the Commission's dis retion to determine w en sue n Ice wou d e appr2Jll"iate and
wnen It would not.
Accordingly, the judgment of the
Courtof Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

211

Cf. United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,- U . S . - , - (1984)
("'absent unambiguous directions from Congress,'" the summons power
conferred on the Internal Revenue Service by statute should not be restricted by the courts) (quoting United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U. S. 141,
150 (1975)).
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